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 Executive  summary 
 
 
The Merger Regulation adopted by the Council in 1989 provided the Community for the first time 
with an adequate instrument for the control of cross-border concentrations. European merger control 
has been heralded as a success. Within the EEA, mergers falling within the Regulation have all been 
subject to the same rules and assessed by a single authority, the Commission. This was done rapidly 
and efficiently, on the basis of transparent procedures.   
 
Since the Regulation entered into force in 1990, more than 350 final decisions have been adopted by 
the Commission. In a large number of cases the notified transactions did not raise competition 
problems and were therefore cleared within one month. Where, however, the merger would create or 
reinforce dominance, measures were taken to prevent a deterioration in the competitive structure of 
the market. Four operations were thus prohibited and 24 other transactions were substantially altered 
so as to take account of the Commission's competition concerns. 
 
After nearly five years of European merger control, the Commission is bound, in light of its 1993 
commitment to the Council, to examine the workings of the Merger Regulation. This requirement 
covers mainly the level of the turnover thresholds, above which concentrations are notifiable to the 
Commission, but also the means by which transactions are referred between the Commission and the 
Member States. The Commission is, in addition, taking this opportunity to respond to shortcomings 
of the Regulation and to criticisms of its operation to date. 
 
The Green Paper which follows details the existing regulatory framework for mergers at both the 
Community and Member State level. It then presents a series of options for discussion. These may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
-Thresholds: at present the turnover of the companies involved in a concentration must exceed ECU 
5 billion on a worldwide basis and, for at least two of those companies, ECU 250 million 
in the Community. A considerable number of mergers likely to affect market structure in 
more than one Member State fall below these high levels. The information available to the 
Commission suggests that thresholds of ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million respectively 
would be more appropriate. 
 
-Multiple notifications: companies whose turnovers do not reach the present high levels of turnover, 
are faced with 13 different national merger control systems in the EEA. Multiple national 
filings increase uncertainty, effort and cost for business and may lead to conflicting 
decisions. A threshold reduction would solve this problem to a large extent. As a "second 
best solution", it could be provided that cases of multiple notification below the current 
thresholds would only be controlled by the Commission. 
 
-Joint ventures: two main approaches for improving the treatment of joint ventures within the 
framework of Community competition law are presented. These two approaches are 
detailed by reference to various options for implementation. 
 
-A number of other, mainly procedural improvements are proposed concerning the acceptance of 
commitments in the first phase of investigation and other aspects of the Regulation. 
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-Banking income: proposals to simplify the method of calculating turnover for credit and financial 
institutions and the geographic allocation of this turnover are made. 
 
The purpose of this Green Paper is to stimulate a far-reaching debate. Its preparation has drawn upon 
the opinions expressed by other Community institutions, the Member States, and the industry and 
legal profession during the Commission survey carried out last year. However, the options presented 
in this Green Paper should not be considered to be either complete or exhaustive. 
 
The Commission believes that the Regulation's scope should be extended to cover a larger number of 
mergers with a Community dimension. Furthermore, current practice can be improved in the ways 
mentioned in the Paper. The opinion of all interested parties is sought to allow a full discussion of 
these issues.       
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
1.Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings ("the Merger 
Regulation") was adopted on 21 December 1989 and entered into force on 21 September 
1990. The Merger Regulation applies to all concentrations having a Community dimension 
defined on the basis of the annual turnover of the companies concerned. 
 
2.The Commission first examined the functioning of the Merger Regulation in 1993. That exercise 
was prompted by the legal obligation to review the turnover thresholds under Article 1 and 
the case referral rules under Articles 9 and 22. In addition, the Commission took the 
opportunity to examine the operation of the Regulation as a whole, in order to identify other 
areas in which improvements could be made. 
 
3.The result of the 1993 exercise was a Report from the Commission to the Council
1 which 
concluded that there were strong arguments in favour of a threshold reduction. However, the 
Commission considered that it would be prudent to gain further experience of the operation 
of the Merger Regulation and of the impact of national merger control policies before 
making any formal proposal for revision. It therefore invited the Council to postpone the 
review of the thresholds until the end of 1996 at the latest. The Council endorsed these 
conclusions in September 1993. 
 
4.In the two years that have elapsed since the 1993 exercise, there have been significant changes in 
the legal, political and economic environment. As a result of the enlargement of the Union, 
but also of regulatory developments in the old Member States, there has been an increase in 
the number of national merger control systems in the Community. At the Community level, 
merger control has entered into a phase of consolidation, exemplified by the adoption of a 
new Implementing Regulation
2 and a new set of guidelines at the end of 1994
3. In addition, 
the practical applications of the subsidiarity principle were developed in more detail by the 
Community institutions and the Member States. Finally, in the context of an ever-increasing 
market integration in the Community and the recent economic upturn, trans-national merger 
activity has intensified
4. Against this background, a review of the Regulation is necessary in 
order to establish how the benefits of the internal market can best be ensured by an effective 
European merger control policy. 
 
5.In the context of the current merger review, the Commission services conducted a survey of 
Member States, companies, industry associations and advisers to seek their views as to a 
revision of the Regulation (see Annex 1). The European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee were also invited to express their opinion. 
                     
     
1COM (93) 385 final, 28 July 1993. 
     
2Commission Regulation (EC) No 3384/94 of 21 December 1994, OJ No L 377, 31.12.94, p.1. 
     
3Commission Notices of 21 December 1994, OJ No C 385, 31.12.1994, p. 1, 5, 12 and 21. 
     
4After reaching its peak in 1990, cross-border M & A activity diminished in 1991 to stabilise in the following 
years at about 1350 operations per year.  1994 was, however, characterized by an increase of M & A activity, 
both in terms of the number of operations and in terms of value, European Economy (March 1995), 
Supplement A.  
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6.The Green Paper is published as a basis for further discussion of specific changes that may be 
made to the Regulation. It has the following objectives: 
 
-to provide an analysis of the current situation; 
 
-to examine, pursuant to the commitment made by the Commission to the Council in 1993, whether 
the current thresholds should be revised; 
 
-to identify other areas where improvements could be made and to present possible solutions. 
 
7.The Commission will consult the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions on the content of this Green Paper. It also 
invites all interested parties to submit comments. In order to respect the timetable of the 
review exercise, such comments should be communicated to the Commission by no later 
than 31 March 1996
5. The Commission then intends to examine the results of the 
consultation process and make a proposal to the Council within 1996. 
 
II.THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A.MERGER CONTROL AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 
 
1.The Merger Regulation 
 
8.The Merger Regulation gave the European Commission specific powers for the assessment of all 
concentrations with a Community dimension. These are mergers, acquisitions or 
concentrative joint ventures in which: (i) the world-wide turnover of all the companies 
involved exceeds ECU 5 billion; (ii) the Community turnover of at least two of the 
companies involved exceeds ECU 250 million (this means a minimum of ECU 500 million 
combined Community turnover); and (iii) all companies involved do not realize more than 
two-thirds of their Community turnover in one and the same Member State (Article 1 of the 
Regulation). 
 
9.The Regulation is based on the "one-stop shop" principle. This means that the Commission has 
exclusive competence to assess concentrations with a Community dimension and that, as a 
result, the companies concerned need only make one notification within the European Union. 
Below the thresholds, concentrations are subject to national merger control if that exists. 
Following the entry into force of the 1994 Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA), the European Commission's exclusive competence for concentrations meeting the 
thresholds has been extended to cover the whole EEA territory. 
 
10.The allocation of cases between the Commission and the Member States under Article 1 is 
complemented by the provisions of Articles 9, 21, paragraph 3 and 22. Article 9 enables the 
Commission to refer to a Member State cases raising competition issues limited to a distinct 
                     
     
5Observations can be sent to by fax (fax no. 32-2-296 43 01) or by post to the following address: Commission of the 
European Communities, Directorate- General for Competition (DG IV), Directorate B-Merger Task Force, 
Avenue de Cortenberg 150, B-1049, Brussels, Belgium.   
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market within its territory. Article 22, paragraphs 3-5, allows a Member State to request the 
Commission to apply the Merger Regulation to operations below the thresholds creating or 
strengthening dominance within that Member State's territory. Article 21, paragraph 3, 
allows Member States to take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than 
those taken into consideration by the Merger Regulation, including public security, plurality 
of the media and prudential rules. Moreover, in the course of its investigation and assessment 
of notified concentrations, the Commission acts in close and constant liaison with the 
competent authorities of the Member States (Article 19 of the Merger Regulation) as well as 
the EFTA Surveillance authority (Article 58 of the EEA Agreement). 
 
11.The Merger Regulation set up a system of mandatory prior notification for all concentrations of 
Community dimension. Notified concentrations are assessed from the point of view of their 
effect on the structure of competition in the common market. The basic concept is that of 
"creation or strengthening of a dominant position". There are two phases of examination 
whose duration is determined by legal deadlines. After an initial one-month phase, the 
Commission must decide whether or not the case raises serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the common market and, in the affirmative, initiate an in-depth investigation. Four 
months after the initiation of phase 2 proceedings, the Commission must take the final 
decision on the concentration. 
 
12.As of 30 October 1995, 376 concentrations had been notified to the Commission under the 
Merger Regulation. The Commission has adopted 357 final decisions: 
 
-31 decisions under Article 6(1)a of the Regulation (declaring that the operation falls outside the 
scope of the Regulation);  
-303 decisions under Article 6(1)b of the Regulation (declaring the concentration compatible with 
the common market at the end of the first phase of investigation); 
-19 decisions under Article 8(2) of the Regulation (declaring the concentration compatible with the 
common market at the end of a phase 2 in-depth investigation);  
-and 4 decisions under Article 8 3) of the Regulation (prohibiting a concentration). 
 
Twelve cases under Article 6(1)b and twelve cases under Article 8(2) were cleared subject to 
conditions and/or obligations to ensure compliance with commitments given by the parties. 
Three cases were referred to Member States following a request under Article 9 and two 
requests were made by Member States under Article 22 (3). In three cases Article 21 (3) was 
applied. 
 
2.Article 66 of the European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECSC) 
 
13.The ECSC Treaty provides that all concentrations involving at least one undertaking engaged in 
the production or distribution of coal or steel and established in the Community are subject to 
prior authorization by the Commission. With the assent of the Council, the Commission has 
set minimum levels, based on the companies' volumes of production, below which 
concentrations are exempted from the requirement of prior notification. For crude steel or 
finished products, for example, there is a minimum level of 6 million tons per year, which 
corresponds to approximately ECU 2.5 billion. 
 
B.MERGER CONTROL AT MEMBER STATE LEVEL  
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14.There are currently eleven national merger control systems in the Community
6, of which eight are 
mandatory. Out of the remaining four Member States, the Netherlands is in the process of 
adopting a system of mandatory pre-merger control and it is not excluded that the other three 
may also introduce national legislation in the future. A table setting out the main features of 
the existing national systems and the proposed Dutch system is included in Annex 2. 
 
15.A comparative analysis of the different national systems shows that there is a great variety in the 
notification requirements, procedures used and legal standards applied. Formal cooperation 
between the national authorities that may be involved in the same case is mainly limited to 
some bilateral contacts, generally for information purposes. 
 
16.As regards the authority competent to deal with mergers within each Member State, in most 
countries more than one separate authority plays a role in the decision-making process. Out 
of the eleven countries, in five the final decision is taken by an administrative/ministerial 
body, in four by an independent competition authority, in one by a judicial authority, and in 
one either by a judicial authority (prohibition decision) or by a competition authority 
(clearance). Finally, in two countries the decision of the independent competition authority 
may be overruled by an administrative/ministerial body on grounds of public interest. 
 
17.The thresholds triggering an obligatory or voluntary notification also vary to a large extent in 
terms of the criteria used (i.e. turnover, either in the country concerned or world-wide, world-
wide assets or market share in the country concerned) and the level at which intervention is 
set (the required world-wide turnover of each of at least two companies concerned is, for 
example, ECU 0,36 million in Austria, ECU 25,2 million in Ireland and ECU 520 million in 
Germany, the total world-wide turnover is, for example, ECU 430 million in Sweden and 
ECU 1,04 billion in Germany, and the required total turnover in the country concerned is, for 
example, ECU 125 million in Spain, ECU 180 million in Portugal and ECU 300 million in 
Italy or more than ECU 1 billion in France)
7. To the extent that the different levels of 
intervention do not fully correspond to differences in the respective sizes of the national 
economies, they may lead to varying degrees of control for companies of comparable size. 
 
18.As regards the duration of proceedings in the different Member States, the preliminary phase of 
investigation is generally short and does not in any case exceed two and a half months. The 
duration of in-depth investigations is more varied, especially because in some cases there are 
no statutory deadlines, while in others the legal deadlines can be extended, for instance for 
the receipt of additional information. Moreover, a number of systems provide for control 
after the implementation of a concentration within a period ranging from one month to an 
unlimited period. 
 
19.In terms of assessment, all Member States use competition criteria in their analysis of notified 
mergers. The possibility to take account of public or general interest criteria is also provided 
in most cases. The precise impact of these other criteria in the final assessment of the case is 
difficult to establish and may differ from one Member State to the other. 
 
                     
     
6There are two additional systems of voluntary notification in the EEA, namely in Iceland and in Norway. 
     
7These thresholds were converted into Ecu on the basis of the average rates for 1994.  
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20.The number of cases examined under each of the eleven Member State systems varies 
considerably. In the countries that have a system of mandatory notification, the average 
number of cases ranged from 25 per year in the case of Portugal to about 1540 a year in the 
case of Germany
8. Of the three countries with a system of voluntary notification, France and 
Spain received on average about 24 cases per year, while the United Kingdom received 150-
200 cases per year.  
 
21.There are differences among Member States with regard to the manner of publication of their 
decisions and the amount of information contained therein. In some cases the whole text of 
the decision, including the competitive assessment of the case, is published. In other cases 
only certain decisions (e.g. prohibitions or most important decisions) are published, while for 
the rest an announcement is made. 
 
III.CRITERIA DETERMINING THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION 
 
A. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
 
22.This section examines what would be the optimum allocation of merger cases between the 
Commission and Member States in the light of two fundamental community objectives: the 
principle of subsidiarity and the objective of sustaining market integration through a rapid 
and uniform assessment of mergers with significant cross-border effects. It then assesses 
whether, on the basis of the information available, the Regulation thresholds should be 
maintained at their current level. 
 
1.Basic principles 
 
Subsidiarity and merger control 
 
23.The Merger Regulation was intended to apply to significant structural changes "the impact of 
which on the market goes beyond the national borders of any one Member State" (Recital 9). 
Concentrations with significant cross-border effects were considered to have a Community 
dimension. It was therefore decided that the Commission should have exclusive competence 
to deal with them, while Member State merger laws should apply to concentrations with 
mainly national impact. 
 
24.The allocation of cases between the Community and the Member States in the area of merger 
control was thus inspired by the same principles that underpin the notion of subsidiarity. 
According to this notion, action should be taken at the most appropriate level of jurisdiction, 
in view of the objectives to be attained and the means available to the Community and the 
Member States
9. 
 
                     
     
8In the remaining countries the average number of notifications per year was: 35 in Belgium, 55 in Ireland, 132 
in Sweden, 238 in Italy and 310 in Austria (informal and formal). These figures represent an average of the 
notifications made in 1993 and 1994. In Greece about 25 notifications were received per year under the 
previous regime of voluntary notification.  
     
9See  Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the 
Subsidiarity Principle, COM (93) 545 final, 24.11.1993.  
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25.A concentration has significant cross-border effects if its impact on the structure of competition 
extends over a geographic area exceeding the borders of a single Member State. This is, for 
instance, the case when the merging parties have significant activities in several Member 
States or their activities in a single Member State may have significant competitive 
repercussions in other parts of the Community, for example when the concentration may 
impede entry by competitors from other Member States, thus creating obstacles to further 
European integration, or when the entrenchment of a national position may have spillover 
effects in the rest of the Community.  
 
26.For concentrations with significant cross-border effects, action at Community level is justified 
given the objectives of merger control and the means available to the Commission and to 
Member States. Within the Community, the powers of investigation as well as of remedial 
and enforcement action of the Commission extend beyond national boundaries and are 
therefore wider than those of a single Member State. Moreover, in the context of increasingly 
global or at least inter-dependent economies, control at the Community level facilitates the 
assessment of the effects of these mergers in a uniform manner and in their totality. 
 
Market integration and the "one-stop shop" principle 
 
27.Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are one of the most important ways in which industry can 
successfully adapt to the new challenges of a European single market. They are therefore a 
positive consequence of market integration, to the extent that they do not result in lasting 
damage to competition (Recitals 3-5 of the Merger Regulation).  
 
28.It is important that the extent and the manner in which concentrations with significant cross-
border effects are controlled should be uniform throughout the Community. It is also 
desirable that their assessment under the competition rules does not unduly delay their 
implementation or create legal uncertainty. 
 
29.Accordingly, the Merger Regulation has two goals: first, to prevent anti-competitive transactions 
and, second, to provide a single framework within which concentrations with a Community 
dimension are assessed within a definite and foreseeable timetable. The "one-stop shop" 
principle, whereby concentrations with a Community dimension are only controlled at 
Community level, facilitates the accomplishment of the second goal.  
 
30.The application of the "one-stop shop" principle to concentrations with a Community dimension 
is related to the notion of subsidiarity: exclusive control at Community level is justified in 
view of the scale and effects of such transactions. It is also based on efficiency 
considerations. As an alternative to multiple national controls, the single "stop" of the 
Regulation simplifies administrative procedures and enables businesses to minimize the costs 
of restructuring in a single market. It creates a level playing field by ensuring that the same 
notification requirements, procedure and legal standard apply to all concentrations with 
significant cross-border effects. 
 
2.The current thresholds 
 
31.In accordance with the above, the Community dimension of a concentration should ideally be 
defined on the basis of its effects on the market. For reasons of practicability and legal  
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certainty, however, the Merger Regulation uses quantitive criteria to identify operations with 
cross-border effects. These are the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned world-
wide and in the Community.  
 
32.When the Regulation was adopted, it was generally understood that the level of the turnover 
thresholds had been set by way of political compromise. For this reason the Council 
considered that after an initial phase they should be reviewed in the light of the experience 
gained (Recital 10). The Commission and the Council also declared that they would be ready 
to consider taking other factors into account in addition to turnover when the thresholds were 
revised. 
 
33.In its above-mentioned 1993 Report, the Commission stated that, with progressive market 
integration in the Community, cross-border merger activity had substantially increased, but 
only a small number of those cases fell within the scope of the Regulation. The Report gave 
specific examples of concentrations that fell outside the Regulation, although they were 
likely to affect competitive conditions throughout the Community. On this basis, the 
Commission concluded that the Regulation thresholds should be reduced.  
 
34.The results of the present review tend to suggest that the reasons for which a threshold reduction 
appeared to be appropriate in 1993 are still valid today. While, with continuing market 
integration, cross-border merger activity has further increased in size and importance
10, there 
are indications that a considerable number of concentrations with significant cross-border 
effects fall below the current thresholds. This is due to the size and/or characteristics of 
sectors where cross-border merger activity takes place, and to the size of the companies 
involved. Moreover, it appears that concentrations with significant cross-border effects 
falling below the thresholds are likely to be subject to multiple national filings that increase 
uncertainty and cost and may lead to conflicting decisions. 
 
Sectoral coverage of the Regulation 
 
35.The Commission competence depends on the level of the aggregate turnover that the companies 
concerned realize world-wide and in the Community. The Merger Regulation is therefore 
more likely to apply to concentrations involving companies active in markets with very large 
total turnover and/or conglomerate enterprises. By contrast, concentrations in which the 
acquirer and/or the target are specialized companies, active in smaller but still economically 
important markets, are less likely to meet the thresholds.  
 
36.The Commission has carried out two separate assessments in order to ascertain the sectoral 
coverage of the Regulation. These are set out below together with an appreciation of their 
results. 
 
37.The first analysis involves the comparison of the number of notifications under the Merger 
Regulation by economic sector with the number of concentrations listed by AMDATA
11 in 
the corresponding sector. This has identified a number of sectors whose coverage by the 
                     
     
10See ftn. 4. 
     
11A database providing information on mergers and acquisitions compiled by Acquisitions Monthly.  
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Regulation is below or just above 10%
12. Examples of such sectors include mechanical 
engineering, electrical and electronic engineering, computer manufacturing, rubber and 
plastic products, textiles, manufacture of food products and beverages, metal products, 
manufacture of wood, manufacture of medical instruments, construction, energy supply, 
printing and publishing, hotels and catering, computer and related services, banking and 
finance. The coverage of some other sectors is also limited. For instance, chemicals, the 
sector where the largest number of notifications are made under the Regulation, has a 
coverage of only some 16%. 
 
38.The second analysis aims at the identification of specific concentrations with significant cross-
border effects falling below the current thresholds
13. These concentrations cover a wide 
variety of sectors, some of which were also identified under the above exercise. Examples of 
these sectors are: chemical products including base chemicals, specialty chemicals and 
downstream applications; pharmaceuticals; components for the automotive industry; 
mechanical and electrical engineering; biotechnology; construction materials; computer 
software; paper products; publishing; aircraft leasing; tourist services and catering.  
 
39.These concentrations were excluded from the Merger Regulation either because all companies 
involved taken together did not meet the world-wide threshold or because the Community-
wide threshold was not met by each of at least two of those companies. With regard to the 
Community-wide threshold in particular, it must be noted that even if a very large company 
acquires a smaller company having a high Community market share, the fact that the latter 
company has a Community turnover below 250 million ECU will mean that the operation 
falls outside the scope of the Merger Regulation. Similarly, even operations involving two 
large companies may fail to meet the Community threshold, if they concern a swap or 
acquisition of specific parts or businesses. In such cases, as far as the seller is concerned, 
only the turnover of the acquired part can be taken into account, and even if this corresponds 
to a high Community market share, it may still fall short of the Regulation threshold.  
 
40.Restructuring operations in most of the above-mentioned sectors often have a trans-national 
dimension, since company activity extends over several Member States. Their weak 
coverage therefore indicates that a considerable number of cross-border operations are 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation. In some other sectors, such as banking and 
finance or energy supply,  the market players tend to have a strong national presence. 
However, even in these sectors it appears that operations are increasingly being structured on 
cross-border lines. With the existing thresholds, such concentrations remain outside the scope 
of Community jurisdiction.  
 
                     
     
12By way of comparison, the coverage of certain other sectors such as air transport and telecoms is more than 50%. 
The reasons for these differences are due to the characteristics of each sector explained in the present 
section. 
     
13The Commission has compiled two lists of specific examples of such cases, the first covering the period up to 
1993 and the second covering the period 1993-95. These lists have been communicated to the Member States, 
but are not annexed to this paper for reasons of confidentiality.  Most of these cases would have come within 
the scope of the Regulation under lower thresholds of ECU 2 billion (world-wide) and ECU 100 million 
(Community-wide).  
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41.There are various reasons why concentrations with a Community dimension within the above-
mentioned sectors are excluded from the Regulation. These reasons are linked to the specific 
characteristics of each sector. 
 
42.First, in some sectors such as textiles, printing and publishing or hotels and catering, the total 
turnover achieved by even the largest companies is below the current world-wide threshold
14. 
This does not mean that the sector as such is of minor importance. To give one example, in 
1993, European production in the textiles sector amounted to ECU 106 billion and 
consumption to ECU 110 billion. The three largest EU textile companies are among the ten 
largest in the world
15. 
 
43.Second, in a number of diversified sectors, there is company specialization in segments of 
relatively small total turnover. In these sectors, acquisitions of specialized companies with 
significant market presence or transfers of businesses/divisions of larger groups can be 
excluded from the Merger Regulation. For instance, in the vehicle spare parts and 
components sector, despite the presence of some large international companies, there is a 
considerable degree of fragmentation due to a large number of small to medium-sized 
specialized producers. 
 
44.The sector of mechanical engineering is another interesting example. This important sector - in 
1992 it occupied the fifth place in the EC industrial production ranking - includes a wide 
range of diversified products. The industry has a polarized structure, with a high degree of 
concentration at the top end of the industry, a limited number of very large players and a 
large number of small and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
45.In the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, about 16% of all concentrations are notified to the 
Commission. For such an industry of transnational dimension, this coverage can be regarded 
as relatively weak.The main explanation for this appears to be the great diversity of chemical 
products and the trend towards specialization via restructuring. This strategy results in a 
number of swaps or acquisitions falling outside the Regulation because of the small turnover 
of the acquired/divested business. 
 
Company coverage of the Regulation 
 
46.The current thresholds catch only a small percentage of European companies. Out of the largest 
2200 European companies included in the 1995 DABLE Synopsis of European Enterprises
16, 
only 152 companies in the EU and EFTA States (7% of all DABLE companies) had in 1993 
a world-wide turnover in excess of ECU 5 billion. A total of 293 companies (13% of all 
DABLE companies) had a world-wide turnover in excess of ECU 2.5 billion and would thus 
come under Community control in a concentration involving companies of equal size. 
 
47.Although these figures do not include all companies covered by the Regulation, notably non-
European companies, they indicate that the company coverage of the Regulation is relatively 
limited. This is all the more significant, because market globalisation and increasing 
                     
     
14The data used are included in the 1995 DABLE Synopsis of European Enterprises. 
     
15Panorama of EC Industry, Ch. 14, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1994). 
     
16The European Commission's Database on Large Enterprises.   
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integration within the Community are expected to lead to the involvement of a larger number 
of companies, including medium-sized enterprises, in cross-border merger activity in the 
future. Medium-sized enterprises that do not benefit from the "one-stop shop principle" 
would probably come within the jurisdiction of several Member States and thus be subject to 
multiple national filings. 
 
The two-thirds rule 
 
48.Data concerning the extent of the application of the two-thirds rule to European companies are 
not generally available. The Commission is, however, aware of some large European groups, 
such as Siemens, that meet the two-thirds rule and yet have substantial activities in the 
Community outside their home market. Concentrations between two or more such groups of 
the same nationality would fall outside the Regulation, although they could have substantial 
repercussions across the Community.  
 
Geographic markets affected by concentrations below the thresholds 
 
49.The Commission has requested the Member States to specify in how many cases notified to them 
in the last two years the relevant geographic market was defined as being larger than national 
or more than one national geographic market was affected.  
 
50.Based on these replies, the Commission has tried to make an estimate of the number of cases with 
significant cross-border effects below the thresholds. However, the information required was 
in many cases to a greater or lesser extent unavailable. Even in those cases where data were 
available, only some concentrations likely to have significant cross-border effects could be 
identified, namely those in which the geographic market was defined as being larger than 
national
17. According to these data, at least about 10% of the cases notified in Italy, about 
20% in France, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, more than 30% in Austria and more than 50% 
in Germany
18 would appear likely to have significant cross-border effects. 
 
Multiple national filings 
 
51.Concentrations with significant cross-border effects falling below the thresholds are subject to 
national merger laws. Because of their trans-national character, these operations are likely to 
meet the notification requirements of more than one national system. 
 
52.Multiple national filings are a direct consequence of the high level of the current Community 
thresholds and of the multiplication of national merger control systems in the European 
Union. As a general rule, the existence of multiple national filings is indicative of the cross-
border effects of an operation. Such concentrations should therefore be dealt with at 
Community level. 
                     
     
17Concentrations affecting one or several national geographic markets can also have significant effects going 
beyond the borders of a single Member State, but this information is not readily available. 
     
18The German data relate to operations in which at least one non-German company was involved. Although not 
all cases in which companies of different nationalities are involved have effects going beyond the 
boundaries of a single Member State, these data can be used as an indication of the number of operations 
with cross-border effects.   
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53.According to the survey, the overwhelming majority of companies, industry associations and 
advisers believe that the "single stop" of the Regulation is a benefit to business. When a 
concentration is notified in several Member States, deadlines for decision-making may differ 
and completion of the deal will be dependent on the decision of the last authority. 
Differences in approach between the national systems involved, for instance with regard to 
the application of public interest criteria, may affect the predictability of the final outcome. In 
this respect, the greatest advantages of the "one-stop shop" appear to be legal certainty and 
speed of decision-making.  
 
54.In practical terms, dealing with a plurality of different authorities requires the coordination of 
information to be provided with regard to timing and argumentation. The facts contained in 
the notification and the manner they are presented needs to be adapted to the particularities of 
each national market and procedure. Moreover, familiarity with different legal systems and 
the ability to work in different languages is required. For most companies this necessitates 
recourse to external local experts.  
 
55.Multiple notifications imply additional effort and costs, both external and internal. The cost 
savings resulting from the application of the "one-stop shop" are very difficult to quantify, 
because they depend on the size of the company, the complexity of the case and the number 
of national authorities that would be involved should the Commission not have jurisdiction. 
According to the survey, it seems, however, that as a general rule and in comparable cases, 
the application of the Regulation represents a significant cost advantage for business. 
 
56.The "single stop" of the Regulation creates a level playing field for all companies restructuring 
their operations in Europe. According to the survey,  the Commission's trans-national 
character facilitates the global assessment of cross-border cases and limits the technical 
difficulties associated with the examination of larger than national markets. Single control 
eliminates the risk of conflicting decisions. In addition, it is easier and more effective to 
negotiate remedial action and third parties can intervene more effectively when only one 
authority is involved.  
 
57.The extent of multiple national filings is only partly related to the mandatory or voluntary 
character of notification under national law. For reasons of legal certainty, companies may 
feel that they should notify even if notification is voluntary, at least when their market shares 
are significant. In any case, the risk involved in non-notification must be assessed, especially 
since the national authorities may take action after the deal is implemented. 
 
Overall assessment 
 
58.The information available at the present tends to suggest that the curent thresholds should be 
reduced, in order that the bulk of operations with significant cross-border effects can be dealt 
with at Community level. This would not only enable the Commission to treat more cross-
border cases where dominance could be created or strengthened, but would also speed up and 
increase consistency in the way such cases are examined, on the basis of a "one-stop shop" 
principle.  
 
B.PROPOSED OPTIONS  
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59.This section states that in order to achieve a better coverage of concentrations with significant 
cross-border effects, it would be more appropriate to have a combined world-wide threshold 
of ECU 2 billion and a Community threshold of ECU 100 million for each of at least two 
companies involved. In order to address the problem of multiple national filings in particular, 
another more limited solution could consist in extending the Commission competence only to 
those concentrations below the thresholds that come within the jurisdiction of more than one 
national system of merger control. 
 
1.Threshold reduction 
 
Position of Community Institutions 
 
60.There is support for a threshold reduction both from the European Parliament and from the 
Economic and Social Committee. More specifically, in its Resolution on the Twenty-third 
Report on Competition Policy, adopted on 16 March 1995, the European Parliament renewed 
its support for a Commission proposal which would substantially reduce the level of turnover 
at which the Commission was required to act
19. Similarly, in its Opinion on the Review of 
the Community Merger Regulation, adopted on 25 October 1995, the Economic and Social 
Committee urged the Commission to propose a world-wide threshold of ECU 2 billion and a 
Community threshold of ECU 100 million. It also recommended that the 2/3 rule should be 
dropped
20. 
 
The position of Member States 
 
61.According to the preliminary opinions expressed to date, the views of Member States as to 
threshold reduction diverge. A number of Member States are strongly in favour of lowering 
the thresholds, while others wish to maintain the current level. On the other hand, there 
seems to be more or less general agreement that the Commission should examine the issue of 
multiple notifications and seek a practical solution to it. 
 
Observations of companies, industry associations and advisers  
 
62.According to the Commission survey, out of all answers received, the majority of companies and 
advisers would be in favour of lowering the world-wide and Community thresholds. Views 
were more divided with regard to the desirability of changing the 2/3 rule. 
 
63.Eleven out of the twenty-four associations that replied to the survey were in favour of a threshold 
reduction. Some other associations, including UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe) and ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), had mixed views 
reflecting the divergent positions of their members. For this reason, they suggested that 
companies should have the option to notify concentrations below the thresholds either to the 
Commission or to the national authorities concerned. As to the 2/3 rule, most associations 
                     
     
19See Point 32 of the Resolution of the European Parliament on XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy, OJ 
C89/146, 10.4.95.  
     
20 Opinion on the Review of the Merger Regulation, ECOSOC 1157/95.   
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suggested that it should be maintained, with the notable exception of the BDI 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), which recommended its deletion.  
 
The position of the Commission  
 
64.At the time of the adoption of the Regulation, the Commission stated that the world-wide 
threshold should be reduced to ECU 2 billion at the end of an initial period of four years. It 
also considered that the Community-wide turnover should be revised in the light of 
experience and the trend of the world-wide threshold, which would imply a corresponding 
reduction to ECU 100 million.  
 
65.It was explained above the current levels of both the world-wide and the Community threshold 
appear to exclude a considerable number of operations with significant cross-border effects 
from the Regulation. The results of the present survey tend therefore to suggest that the need 
for a threshold reduction is at least as compelling today as it was in 1993. The precise level 
of such lower thresholds is difficult to establish. On the basis of the information available at 
present, it seems, however, that ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million would allow most cross-
border cases to come within the Regulation, in accordance with subsidiarity. They would 
also largely solve the problem of multiple national filings to which a number of operations 
with significant cross-border effects are currently subject. Accordingly, the Commission 
believes at this stage that these levels would be appropriate. At the same time, it will 
naturally consider whether these levels should be re-assessed in the light of further 
information that may be brought to its attention during the consultation period. 
 
66.The Commission accepts that the 2/3 rule can in some cases exclude concentrations with 
significant cross-border effects from the scope of the Regulation. If a 3/4 rule were to be 
introduced, a larger number of such cases would come within the Regulation. On the other 
hand, a substantial number of cases of mainly national impact would likely be caught. 
Consequently, the Commission considers at this stage that on balance the maintenance of the 
2/3 rule would probably be more consistent with the subsidiarity principle. 
 
67.It was suggested to the Commission that a threshold reduction could increase the number of 
notifications with mainly national impact and therefore the number of requests for referral 
under Article 9. The implications of a threshold reduction for the application of Article 9 are 
discussed under IV.A. below. 
 
Inflation and enlargement of the Union 
 
68.The Commission has examined the impact of inflation and the enlargement of the Union on the 
existing thresholds. It seems that this has been rather limited. In particular: 
 
(i)On average within the EU, inflation and currency fluctuation (i.e. devaluation or appreciation) in 
the period 1989-94 have led to an erosion of the first threshold from ECU 5 billion to 
ECU 4.3 billion and of the second threshold from ECU 250 million to ECU 216 
million.  This decrease cannot be ignored, but in the light of the figures mentioned in 
paragraph 61 above, it is not significant enough to negate the need for reducing the 
current thresholds.  
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(ii)It was suggested to the Commission that as a result of the enlargement of the Union, more 
companies would fall within the Regulation, because their Community turnover 
would increase and/or the 2/3 rule would no longer apply. However, among the cases 
notified to the Commission since 1 January 1995 only a limited number met the 
thresholds because of the additional turnover realized in the new Member States. 
 
Estimate of extra cases 
 
69.The precise number of extra cases resulting from a threshold reduction is difficult to predict. An 
estimate has been made based on information provided by the Member States. The data 
given relate to the number of national merger notifications in 1993 and 1994 that would fall 
within the Merger Regulation, if the world-wide and Community thresholds were reduced to 
ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million respectively and the 2/3 rule were maintained. 
 
70.On this basis, it is estimated that the Commission workload would increase by an extra 65-80 
cases per year. This is comparable to a DG II forecast
21, which was 65 extra cases per year, 
or 90 if an estimate for concentrative joint ventures is also included in the calculation.  
 
Impact on Commission resources 
 
71.Concern was expressed as to whether the increase in the Commission workload resulting from a 
threshold reduction would endanger the effectiveness of the existing procedures and the 
quality of the competition analysis. A threshold reduction proposal should be justified by 
general policy considerations, but would naturally have to take into account the need for any 
additional resources so as not to reduce quality and efficiency.  
 
2.Cases of multiple notification 
 
72.Concentrations subject to multiple notification can generally be considered to have significant 
cross-border effects. In accordance with subsidiarity, they should therefore be dealt with at 
Community level. Moreover, multiple national filings increase uncertainty, effort and cost 
for business and may lead to conflicting decisions contrary to the idea of a "level playing 
field".  
 
73.There is wide-spread concern among industry about concentrations below the thresholds meeting 
the notification requirements of several national systems. Consequently, companies and 
associations, including those that would not be in favour of a general threshold reduction, 
urged the Commission to make a proposal ensuring that such cases are dealt with at 
Community level. 
 
Policy options 
 
74.Merger control systems in the European Union are highly diverse. Their harmonization e.g. by 
means of a Community directive could alleviate the administrative burden of multiple 
national filings. The Commission would encourage any efforts towards harmonization, 
                     
     
21"Competition and Integration: Community Merger Control Policy", 57 European Economy (1994), 2.2.3.4., p. 
38.   
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especially with regard to the form of notification and other procedural rules. At the same time 
harmonization would not be the most appropriate solution to the problem of multiple 
notifications for the following reasons. Even putting aside the difficulties and time necessary 
for changing the national laws, companies would still have to notify to several national 
authorities and provide information relating to the specific features of each national market. 
More importantly, operations with significant cross-border effects would still have to be 
examined at Member State level, contrary to the subsidiarity principle. 
 
75.A number of industry associations, including UNICE, ICC, CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat 
Français) and AGREF (Associations des Grandes Entreprises Françaises), have proposed 
that in cases of multiple notification falling between the current thresholds and some lower 
thresholds to be defined - for instance ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million -the companies 
concerned could have the option of notifying either to the Commission or to the relevant 
national authorities. The Commission or the national authorities concerned, as the case may 
be, would have exclusive competence when notified. It is clear that this solution is desirable 
from a business perspective, because it allows the greatest degree of flexibility. On the other 
hand, it would leave the choice of jurisdiction to the discretion of the companies concerned. 
For this reason, it appears at this stage that, in devising a solution to the problem, it would be 
more appropriate to find clear and objective criteria for the division of competences between 
the Commission and the Member States.  
 
 Proposed  options 
 
76.As explained above, it appears that a threshold reduction to ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million
22 
would bring the bulk of cases with significant cross-border effects within the Regulation. At 
the same time this would largely solve the problem of multiple notifications, to the extent 
that otherwise a number of these cases would have been notifiable to several national 
authorities. 
 
77.In order to address the problem of multiple national filings in particular, another more limited 
solution could consist in extending the Commission's competence only to those 
concentrations below the thresholds that come within the jurisdiction of more than one 
national system. Compared with a threshold reduction, this solution would bring some, but 
not the bulk of concentrations with significant cross-border effects within the Regulation. 
Because of differences in the notification thresholds used by national laws or the lack of 
merger control legislation in some Member States, the existence or not of multiple national 
filings depends on the national markets in which the undertakings concerned mainly operate. 
The Commission therefore considers this more limited solution to be the minimum required 
to achieve a division of competences consistent with subsidiarity. 
 
78.In accordance with the above, the Commission competence could be extended to cover 
concentrations of multiple notification falling between the current thresholds and lower 
thresholds, for instance ECU 2 billion (world-wide) and 100 million (Community-wide). 
Article 1 of the Merger Regulation could thus be amended to provide that a concentration 
within the meaning of the Regulation that does not meet the thresholds laid down in 
                     
     
22See paragraph 65 above.  
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paragraph 2 has, nevertheless, a Community dimension when it comes within the jurisdiction 
of a number of Member States.  
 
79.A concentration would be considered to come within the jurisdiction of a number of Member 
States if it met the national thresholds triggering an obligation to notify in systems of 
mandatory control or subjecting a concentration to a system of voluntary notification. The 
Commission considers that voluntary systems are relevant in this respect. A concentration 
meeting the threshold of more than one system is likely to have significant cross-border 
effects, regardless of the mandatory or voluntary character of the national systems concerned. 
If one were to exclude voluntary systems in determining the number of authorities involved, 
there would be discrimination among companies participating in cross-border transactions, 
depending on the national markets affected in each case. Finally, for reasons of legal 
certainty, notification also takes place under voluntary systems, especially when the market 
share of the parties is significant.  
 
80.As to the number of national laws that must be applicable, the following should be taken into 
account. In the Commission's view, a concentration coming within the jurisdiction of two 
national systems is likely to have significant cross-border effects and should in principle be 
able to benefit from the "one-stop shop" of the Regulation. Such concentrations should thus 
be dealt with at Community level. It was suggested to the Commission that the Community 
dimension of a concentration may be more manifest when at least three national jurisdictions 
are involved. Member States also stated that in cases where only two national authorities are 
involved, any problems could be more or less adequately solved through bilateral 
coordination. By contrast, coordination would become too complicated and thus ineffective 
when three or more systems come into play. The validity of these arguments, which suggest 
that, at a maximum, the number of national systems involved should be three, needs to be 
explored during the consultation period.  
 
Procedure 
 
81.The above-mentioned cases will be subject to the same substantive and procedural rules that 
apply to any other concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, with the 
following exception: in addition to the normal requirements establishing the Commission's 
competence, it will be necessary to determine whether the concentration meets the 
notification thresholds of a number of  Member States.  
 
82.Two basic approaches exist: either the Member States concerned confirm the application of their 
national thresholds and the Commission is bound by this assessment; or the Commission 
itself decides thereon. The second approach would mean that the Commission would have to 
interpret the national merger laws. This would be impractical and could lead to divergent 
interpretations of national laws by the Commission and the Member States. For these 
reasons, the Commission considers that the first approach is preferable. 
 
83.Two possible ways in which the application of the national laws can be determined are set out 
below.  
 
(i)As part of the formal notification, the parties include in the form CO (in one of the official 
Community languages) all information showing that the operation meets the  
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notification thresholds of a number of Member States. A copy of the form CO is sent 
to Member States as usual. The Member States concerned must inform the 
Commission within a set period of time (e.g. within one to two weeks) when the 
concentration does not meet their thresholds. If the Member States concerned do not 
oppose the analysis of the parties within the set period, the competence of the 
Commission will be established. 
 
(ii)At a stage prior to formal notification, the parties notify the fact of the concentration to the 
Commission. No form CO is required at this stage, only the information showing that 
the operation is a concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation and 
meets the Member States' notification thresholds. The same procedure as under (i) 
above is then followed. There are two variations on this scenario: 
 
-the parties have an obligation to notify the fact of the concentration within the time limits provided 
in Article 4, but the phase 1 deadline starts only after the jurisdictional question has 
been solved and the full form CO has been submitted; or 
-the parties notify the fact of the concentration before the final agreement is concluded or control is 
acquired.  
 
84.In the course of preliminary contacts with interested parties, it was pointed out to the Commission 
that these procedures could raise some practical difficulties. In particular, it was argued that it 
will not always be easy to determine quickly whether a concentration meets the national 
notification thresholds, especially in cases where market-share thresholds are used. 
 
85.To the extent that the application of some national thresholds is difficult in practice, this situation 
is not created by the Commission proposals. Companies are already subject to the operation 
of national laws and must check whether the various notification thresholds apply to their 
deal. During the consultation period following the adoption of the Green Book, the 
Commission will have the opportunity to examine this issue, as well as any further practical 
problems that may be identified.   
 
86.In any event, it is clear that the smaller the number of Member States' laws required for 
establishing the Commission's competence, the simpler the procedures and the greater the 
degree of legal certainty for the companies concerned. In the Commission's view, the 
simplest procedure is where two Member States are involved, while above three Member 
States the system becomes extremely difficult to manage both from the point of view of the 
companies concerned and from the point of view of the regulatory authorities involved. 
 
Number of multiple notifications 
 
87.The Commission is currently aware of about one hundred cases of multiple notification in the last 
two and half years. About 35% of these cases were notified to more than two and up to ten 
national authorities.  
 
88.These figures by no means represent the total number of multiple notifications during that period. 
 The Commission does not at this stage have Member State records for 1995, a year with 
intense merger activity. Existing records for 1993-94 are very difficult to analyse, because 
the data are not kept on the same basis in each Member State.  Moreover, multiple national  
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filings may become more frequent in the future to the extent that companies' awareness of 
newly introduced merger control systems increases, new systems come into force in the 
Community and notification under voluntary systems becomes more common. Market 
integration and the resulting increase in cross-border merger activity should also lead to an 
increase of multiple notifications. For these reasons, the additional number of cases to be 
dealt with by the Commission should be higher than the above-mentioned figures. 
 
IV.OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION 
 
89.In addition to thresholds, the Commission survey identified a number of specific areas in which 
improvements could be made to the Regulation. In order to respond to these concerns, the 
Green Paper proposes changes that amend or clarify the existing provisions. 
 
90.In addition to these changes, the Commission would also consider examining the ECSC Treaty 
provisions relating to concentrations, including thresholds. These issues go beyond the scope 
of the present review and will not be further discussed in this Paper.  
 
91.The proposed changes are mainly procedural. As to substantive matters, the survey identified 
areas where clarifications would be useful, such as the notion of oligopolistic dominance, the 
"failing firm" defence and the "efficiencies" defence. These matters are best dealt with by 
means of interpretative guidelines. 
 
A.Referral of concentrations to and from Member States (Articles 9 and 22) 
 
Article 9 
 
92.Concentrations with mainly national impact are better controlled at the national level. It is 
possible that operations of this kind may fall within the current thresholds. In these cases, and 
in line with subsidiarity, Article 9 of the Regulation provides for a corrective mechanism of 
referral to the national authorities. Three concentrations have so far been referred to national 
authorities: Steetley/Tarmac was referred to the UK authorities, Holdercim/Cedest to the 
French and McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann to the German.  
 
93.The industry and the large majority of Member States have expressed satisfaction with the 
operation of this Article. At the same time, a number of suggestions aiming at clarifying or 
improving the referral procedure were made to the Commission. It was also pointed out that, 
in the event of a threshold reduction, there might be an increase in the number of cases with 
mainly national impact and, as  a result, an increase in requests for referral under Article 9.  
 
94.The Commission considers that, especially if there were not to be a threshold reduction, any 
amendments to Article 9 should be limited so as not to undermine the delicate balance struck 
by the current referral provisions or to negate the advantages of the "one-stop shop" 
principle. Too frequent use of Article 9 could reduce the legal certainty afforded to 
companies and should probably be linked to a harmonization of the main features of national 
merger systems.  
 
95.The Commission therefore proposes that Article 9 be maintained in its current form, with the 
following exception regarding concentrations that affect only a non-substantial part of the  
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common market. It could be provided that in such cases the Member State making the 
request for referral must inform the Commission that the concentration affects a distinct 
market within its territory not constituting a substantial part of the common market. By 
contrast, it will not need to demonstrate that the concentration threatens to create or 
strengthen a dominant position on that market. 
 
96.The Commission also proposes to examine whether its practice with regard to the application of 
Article 9 should be further clarified, for instance by means of an interpretative notice. 
 
Article 22 
 
97.Use of Article 22(3) has already been made on two occasions
23 and it is generally regarded as a 
useful tool, especially for those Member States that do not currently have a merger control 
system. The Commission therefore proposes to maintain it. However, in the light of 
experience, the following amendments could be made: 
 
-It could be expressly provided that an Article 22 request could also be made by several Member 
States, acting by common agreement. Such a request would, for instance, be appropriate in 
cases where a concentration would create or strengthen a dominant position in an area 
wider than the territory of a single Member State and would enable the Commission to 
examine the effects of the concentration to a fuller extent. 
 
-It could be stated that the concentration would be suspended from the date of receipt of the Article 
22 request, provided that it has not been put into effect prior to that date. 
 
  -In order to harmonize the time limits under Article 10 and Article 22, the fourth paragraph of 
Article 22 should be amended as follows: 
"The period within which proceedings may be initiated pursuant to Article 10(1) shall begin on the 
day following that of the receipt of the request by the Member State". 
 
-The text of Article 23 should also be amended to enable the Commission to adopt implementing 
provisions concerning time limits pursuant to Article 22. 
 
B. The treatment of joint ventures 
 
Present situation 
 
98.A distinction is made under the EC competition rules between concentrative and cooperative joint 
ventures. Concentrative joint ventures fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation, while 
cooperative joint ventures are dealt with under Regulation 17/62 and other Regulations 
implementing Article 85 of the EC Treaty. 
 
99.According to Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation, as interpreted by the 1994 Commission 
notice
24, concentrative joint ventures are full-function entities
25 that do not give rise to 
                     
     
23In British Airways/Dan Air and RTL/Veronica/Endemol. 
     
24Commission Notice of 21 December 1994 on the Distinction between Cooperative and Concentrative Joint 
Ventures, OJ N° C 385, 31.12.1994, p. 1.  
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coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent. In 
order to be relevant, coordination must be likely to result in a restriction of competition 
within the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty.  Joint ventures that do not fall within 
Article 3 (2) are considered to be cooperative.  Cooperative joint ventures encompass a wide 
variety of arrangements, ranging from operations of a structural nature to cartel-like 
cooperation. 
 
100.In the Commission survey, a large part of industry as well as a number of Member States 
expressed considerable concern about the differences in treatment between concentrative 
joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures of a structural nature. It is said that both kinds of 
operations are similar in terms of their effects on market structure. They are, however, 
currently subject to different regimes. This situation is widely regarded as unsatisfactory, 
especially to the extent that there are differences in the deadlines for assessment and the 
degree of legal certainty afforded to companies. 
 
101.The Commission has recognised the desirability of harmonization of the regimes applicable to 
joint ventures by introducing a special accelerated procedure in relation to structural 
cooperative joint ventures
26. The Commission set itself a two-month internal deadline, 
applicable since 1 January 1993, within which it should take an initial view concerning 
operations of this kind.  According to the Commission survey, this procedure is a positive 
development, but still does not guarantee full equality of treatment. 
 
Is there a need for change? 
 
102.Cooperative full-function joint ventures involve a significant change in the structure of the 
companies concerned. They may have, in this respect, similar effects on market structure to 
concentrative joint ventures. The main difference between the two types of operations is that, 
in the case of cooperative full-function joint ventures, the independent presence of their 
parent companies in the same market as that of the joint venture or in neighbouring markets 
is regarded as likely to give rise to the coordination of the competitive behaviour of their 
parent companies. For this reason, a different substantive test has been applied to cooperative 
full-function joint ventures.  Different procedural rules have also been applied, with different 
treatment in terms of timing and legal certainty. Since cooperative full-function joint 
ventures may imply a transfer of substantial resources from the parent companies, it should 
be considered to what extent differences in treatment should be reduced. 
 
103.Under the current rules, most concentrative joint ventures are assessed within one month (phase 
1), and the rest within five months (phase 2-in-depth investigation). In all cases the procedure 
is concluded by a formal clearance or prohibition decision which can only be revoked in 
exceptional circumstances (see Article 8 (5) of the Merger Regulation). If no decision is 
taken within these deadlines, the joint ventures is deemed to have been authorized. 
 
                                                                    
     
25This means that they perform all the functions normally carried out by other companies operating in the same 
market and have sufficient financial and other resources to carry out their activities on a lasting basis. 
     
26These are cooperative full-function joint ventures and certain partial-function joint ventures without access to 
the market, in particular research and development or production joint ventures.  
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104.There are no such legal deadlines for cooperative joint ventures of a structural nature.  The two-
month deadline that applies to certain operations of this kind is only an internal one. 
Moreover, given the current procedural constraints under Regulation 17/62, it is not possible 
to adopt a formal decision within two months, but only to issue an administrative letter which 
does not bind the authorities and the courts of the Member States. There is no legal or 
internal deadline for the conclusion of the in-depth investigation. Finally, under Regulation 
17/62, in cases where an exemption is granted, this must be given for a certain period of time 
and the decision can be revoked or modified under the circumstances mentioned in Article 8 
(3) of that Regulation. 
 
105.The above-mentioned differences have been caused by the different implementing Regulations 
applicable to cooperative and concentrative joint ventures and on the view that there is a 
basic difference between restrictions of competition, to be assessed under Article 85, and 
concentrations which are not subject to the fundamental prohibition of agreements and 
restrictive practices which distort competition. Reform of the current arrangements would 
have to remain within the bounds of the Community legal system. To change the substance 
of Article 85 (1) would exceed the limits of the powers of the Community's institutions. 
 
106.It remains to be seen to what extent the system has given rise to practical problems.   
Nevertheless, changes may also be justified by general considerations of competition policy, 
particularly the drive to make the system simpler, more transparent and more effective. 
 
Options to be considered 
 
107.Apart from the option of making pragmatic improvements in internal procedures so as to speed 
up the decision-making process (for instance by reducing existing internal deadlines), there 
are five other options to be considered all of which would require new legislation. These five 
options can be divided into two groups reflecting two different approaches: the first group 
deals with procedural matters while maintaining the substantive tests, while the second group 
would subject structural cooperative joint ventures to both the substantive test and the 
procedural rules of the Merger Regulation. 
 
108.I.Procedural options 
 
a.Create new procedures for the treatment of cooperative full-function joint ventures by means of a 
new Regulation, in order to simplify procedures and provide for fast decisions and 
legal certainty. 
 
b.Make cooperative full-function joint ventures subject to procedures of the Merger Regulation, 
leaving the two substantive tests separate. 
 
c.Extend the scope of Commission block exemption Regulations dealing with horizontal cooperation 
(and adopt a new one for areas not covered by the existing Regulations) to cover 
cooperative full-function joint ventures, with opposition procedures and market share 
thresholds. 
 
109.II.Substantive and procedural options 
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a.Extend Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation to all cooperative full-function joint ventures. 
 
b.Extend Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation to all joint ventures, whether full function or not, 
except shams (cartels dressed up as joint ventures). 
 
110.All of these options would have a significant impact on priorities and resource allocation within 
the Commission's services. 
 
Comments on the options 
 
111.The option of making pragmatic changes to internal procedures would improve the current 
situation without any changes in the law. Since only internal procedures have to be adapted, 
this could be achieved quickly. However, the changes would remain of an internal nature and 
legal certainty would not be provided within a short period of time. 
 
Procedural options 
 
112.Legal certainty could be obtained more quickly under option a with a new Council procedural 
regulation which would introduce a procedure for cooperative full-function joint ventures 
along the lines of the Merger Regulation. The emphasis would be on streamlining 
procedures, while the current substantive test would be maintained. 
 
113.Under option b, cooperative full-function joint ventures would continue to be subject to the 
substantive test of Article 85, paragraphs 1 and 3. At the same time, it would be provided that 
the procedural rules of the Merger Regulation would apply to them, instead of those of 
Regulation 17/62 and the other implementing Regulations that are currently applicable.  
 
114.Cooperative full-function joint ventures would benefit from the timing and other procedural 
advantages of the Merger Regulation. They would also be subject to the same notification 
and other procedural requirements. However, the distinction between cooperative and 
concentrative joint ventures would still govern the substantive test to be applied: 
concentrative joint ventures would be subject to the test of Article 2, while cooperative full-
function  ones would be subject to the test of Article 85, paragraphs 1 and 3. Exemptions 
under Article 85 (3) would be limited in time and revocable in accordance with current law 
and practice, which pays particular attention to the competitive relationships between the 
joint venture's parent companies. 
 
115.Under option c, Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation would remain unchanged. The 
Commission would instead use its legislative powers under Council Regulation (EEC) N° 
2821/71 to cover most of the cooperative joint ventures by a group exemption.  For this 
purpose, Regulations (EEC) N° 417/85 and N° 418/85, which both expire at the end of 1997, 
could be broadened and merged. The advantages of the group exemption would be available 
up to a certain market share. The threshold should be fixed clearly above the current figures 
(which are: 10% for full-function joint ventures, 20% for partial function joint ventures). 
Those not covered by the automatic exemption could be subject to a non-opposition 
procedure with two deadlines: a first one of two months within which the Commission would 
take an initial view (corresponding to the existing internal deadline, but legally binding), and  
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a second one of five months within which the final outcome, be it positive or negative, would 
have to be reached. 
 
116.Under this option the differences between the relevant substantive test would continue to exist. 
The rules on individual procedures, although not being harmonized, would be brought closer 
to each other, thereby accelerating procedures. It is true that the application of a market share 
criterion may give rise to practical difficulties. However, the opposition procedure would 
make the Commission responsible in the final analysis for correctly defining the relevant 
market and the market shares of the interested parties. Cases which meet the requirements for 
automatic exemption would not have to be notified. The exemption granted under the 
regulation would last as long as the group exemption. 
 
Substantive and procedural options 
 
117.Under option a, Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation would be amended to state that "the 
creation of a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity 
shall constitute a concentration with the meaning of paragraph 1 (b)".  This would mean that, 
in substantive terms, the dominance test of Article 2 of the Regulation would also apply to 
the creation of cooperative full-function joint ventures.  In respect of the cooperative aspects 
of the case that are not ancillary, it would be provided that Article 85, paragraphs 1 and 3, 
would apply to them, either within the same procedure or separately. 
 
118.This option would ensure legal certainty and rapid procedures.  Moreover, it would simplify the 
distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures, because the same 
procedures and substantive test would apply to all full-function joint ventures, except for 
clauses which are not ancillary. This option would imply a reassessment of the scope of 
Article 85 (1) with regard to the Commission's existing and long-standing practice and, in 
any event, would have to remain within the bounds of Article 85 as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice. 
 
119.As to the division of jurisdiction between the Commission and the Member States, this option 
would extend to all full-function joint ventures the jurisdictional allocation provided for in 
Article 1 of the Merger Regulation. As a result, national law would apply to full-function 
joint ventures below the thresholds. 
 
120.Finally option b would submit all joint ventures, except hidden cartels, to the Merger Regulation 
through extending Article 3 (2).  As a consequence, both the substantive test and procedure 
would be changed for all cooperative joint ventures. Legal certainty and rapid procedures 
would be provided in the same way as currently for concentrative joint ventures. This option 
would also imply a reassessment of the scope of Article 85 (1) with regard to current and 
well-established practice and, in any event, would have to remain within the bounds of 
Article 85 as interpreted by the Court of Justice. It would create the problem of identifying 
those joint ventures to which Article 85 would remain applicable (hidden cartels). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
121.As will already be clear, the Commission is interested to know how seriously the differences in 
the treatment of co-operative and concentrative joint ventures, in terms of deadlines,  
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procedures, substantive test and legal certainty, are considered. This will clearly influence the 
choice between the various options. The above-mentioned procedural options improve 
procedures, including deadlines, and increase legal certainty. The substantive and procedural 
options appear to offer the most comprehensive and harmonised treatment of concentrative 
and cooperative joint ventures from the point of view of the above criteria. The Commission 
is at this stage open as to the option best suited to address the disparities in the treatment of 
joint ventures and the desire for simplicity, transparency and an effective competition policy.  
 
C.Commitments in merger cases 
 
122.Pursuant to Article 8 (2) of the Merger Regulation, a Phase 2 authorisation decision may be 
subject to conditions and obligations ensuring that the parties comply with the commitments 
they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission. Commitments must be submitted within 
three months from the beginning of Phase 2 (Article 18 of Commission Regulation 3384/94). 
It is not proposed that changes be made in the Commission practice in this area. 
 
123.It is the Commission's practice to accept commitments also in Phase 1 in cases where the 
competition concern is clear-cut and limited compared with the whole deal, can easily be 
remedied and where compliance is easily monitored. The authorization of the concentration 
is based on the fulfilment of these commitments. The Commission considers that such an 
approach provides a regulatory response proportionate to the size of the competition problem 
and the remedy already at hand. There is also overall support from industry and advisers to 
accept commitments in Phase 1, because they avoid the cost and loss of time involved in 
entering Phase 2 proceedings. It is the Commission's policy to give Member States and 
interested third parties the opportunity to comment on proposed commitments before an 
Article 6(1)b decision is adopted. 
 
124.The Commission considers that, under the current regime, it may accept and enforce Phase 1 
commitments. However, legal certainty would increase if an express provision to that effect 
were included in the Regulation. At the same time such commitments must be accepted in a 
manner ensuring transparency and timely consultation of Member States and interested third 
parties. 
 
Proposed changes 
 
125.In accordance with the above, Article 6 (1) b of the Merger Regulation could be amended in line 
with Article 8, paragraphs 2 and 5 (b), so as to give the Commission express powers for 
accepting and enforcing Phase 1 commitments.  
 
126.In order to ensure transparency and to give Member States and interested third parties adequate 
time for comment, it is estimated that a period of at least two weeks from the date of the 
submission of the commitments will be necessary. Consequently, three possible procedural 
solutions could be envisaged: 
 
-A two-week consultation period from the time of the submission of the commitments will be 
required. This may lead to an extension of Phase 1 by a maximum of two weeks. 
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-There would be no extension of the current Phase 1. Companies would have to submit their 
commitments in time for a two-week consultation to take place within the one-month 
period. In view of the time constraints of Phase 1, this solution would be possible in 
practice only if the competition problem and the remedy were identified at a very early 
stage in the procedure. Otherwise, the parties could withdraw their initial notification and 
make a new notification containing the proposed commitments. In cases of withdrawal and 
re-notification, the Commission could, where appropriate, take a decision immediately 
after the three-week period for an Article 9 request. 
 
-A mechanism comparable to Article 9 would be introduced: commitments would have to be 
submitted within three weeks from notification and Phase 1 would be extended to six 
weeks. 
 
D.De minimis operations 
 
127.For the purposes of this Green Paper, an operation is defined as de minimis if it has no or 
insignificant effects on the structure of competition in the Community. 
 
128.It is possible that some de minimis operations may fall within the scope of the Merger 
Regulation. For instance, concentrations that do not lead to an overlap between the merged 
activities in the Community may be notifiable because of the parties' Community turnover in 
markets other than those affected by the operation (see the Seagram/MCA and 
JCSAT/SAJAC cases). In the last two years ten concentrations with no or minimum overlap 
were notified to the Commission. 
 
129.Another example of de minimis operations may be joint ventures of very small turnover which 
may be notifiable because of their parents' turnover. In the last two years there were at least 
20 joint ventures with a turnover of less than ECU 100 million. However, not all of these 
joint ventures were de minimis operations, since in a number of cases market shares 
exceeded 25%. 
 
130.A number of the companies and associations surveyed suggested to the Commission that the 
notification of de minimis operations constitutes an unnecessary burden on business. Such 
operations should therefore be excluded from the scope of the Regulation or examined under 
simplified procedures.  
 
131.The Commission does not consider at this stage that de minimis concentrations should be 
excluded from the Merger Regulation for the following reasons. If de minimis concentrations 
were defined on the basis of turnover thresholds, there would be a risk that operations raising 
competition concerns would also be excluded. Market share thresholds would be more 
appropriate but would reduce legal certainty. Moreover, if de minimis concentrations were 
excluded from the scope of the Merger Regulation, they would no longer benefit from the 
"one-stop shop" principle and could be subject to multiple national filings. 
 
132.Because of the above-mentioned definitional problems, the Commission also considers that it 
would be difficult to lift the suspension under Article 7 of the Merger Regulation for all such 
concentrations. Consequently, to the extent that the notification of de minimis operations 
constitutes an undue burden, the existing procedure should be simplified as much as possible.  
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133.Under the current rules, the information required for de minimis operations notified to the 
Commission is limited. The new form CO
27 provides for short-form notification in cases 
where the turnover of a joint venture and/or the turnover of the contributed activities is less 
than ECU 100 million in the EEA, and the total value of the transferred assets is less than 
ECU 100 million in the EEA. As to operations other than joint ventures, no market 
information is required where the combined market share of the parties does not exceed 15% 
in the same product market and any individual or combined market share does not exceed 
25% in a market upstream or downstream of a product market in which any or more of the 
parties is active. These provisions already reduce the burden of notification to a considerable 
extent. In practice, the information required could be further limited if necessary, on the basis 
of waivers to the form CO. 
 
134.In addition, the Commission could take a short-form decision in de minimis cases without 
having to await the expiry of the legal deadline. These procedural improvements would not 
require an amendment to the Merger Regulation. 
 
E. Turnover calculation for credit and financial institutions 
 
135.In relation to credit and financial institutions, the Merger Regulation, in line with a number of 
Member States' national merger control laws, uses assets instead of turnover for the purposes 
of application of Article 1 (2). In order to determine Community-wide turnover and the 
application of the two-thirds rule, assets are allocated between the Community and Member 
States in accordance with the ratio between loans and advances to Community and Member 
States' residents and their total loans and advances. 
 
136.Two problems have been identified with the Commission's current approach : 
 
(i)a notional turnover figure calculated on the basis of assets excludes certain transactions (eg. 
foreign exchange and security dealing revenues) from the notional turnover figure; 
 
(ii)the identification of the residence of a borrower is, in practice, difficult and may vary over the life 
of the loan. Consequently, the geographic allocation of turnover is onerous for banks. 
 
137.In order to alleviate these problems, the Commission is considering changes in its approach: 
 
(i) Turnover 
 
138.The Commission has studied whether the use of assets or gross banking income would 
significantly change the number or type of banks that would be subject to the Merger 
Regulation. On the footing of this evaluation, it has been concluded that both bases give 
broadly similar results. It is, however, admitted that the use of banking income would more 
properly reflect the economic reality of banks' operations. 
 
139.Gross banking income comprises, at least, the items set out in Article 28 B (1), (2), (3) and (4) of 
Directive 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other 
                     
     
27Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3384/94, of 21 December 1994, OJ L No 377, 31.12.1995, 1.  
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financial institutions. Therefore, interest receivable, income from securities, commissions 
receivable and the net profit on financial operations would be included in such a definition. 
 
140.It could be more appropriate to employ gross as opposed to net banking income as a basis for 
calculating turnover. This is because net banking income effectively equates to gross profit 
in, for example, the manufacturing or service industries, and not to sales. Consequently, 
using such a basis for banks would be inconsistent with the Commission's general approach 
for calculating turnover. However, it remains to be examined which of the two types of 
banking income would more accurately reflect the economic reality of the whole banking 
sector. 
 
(ii)Geographic allocation of turnover 
 
141.The Commission appreciates that allocating income by reference to the location of the borrower 
may be burdensome on banks. Whilst the Commission's notice concerning the calculation of 
turnover provides that turnover arising from services is, in general, allocated to where the 
customer is located, the notice also makes an exception to this rule, in respect of inter-bank 
lending
28. Accordingly, in order to simplify the Commission's approach it can be considered 
that the allocation of banking income should be based on the location of the branch of the 
bank making the loan or providing the service. 
 
F. Other amendments or clarifications 
 
Ancillary restrictions in phase 1 
 
142.In order to have an express legal basis for the acceptance of ancillary restrictions in phase 1 
decisions, the following provision should be added to Article 6 (1) b: 
"The decision declaring the concentration compatible with the common market shall also cover 
restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration." 
 
Revocation of Article 6 decisions 
 
143.In line with Article 8 decisions, it should be expressly provided in the Regulation that the 
Commission may revoke a decision taken under Article 6 (1) a or 6 (1) b where: 
"the declaration of compatibility is based on incorrect information for which one of the undertakings 
is responsible or where it has been obtained by deceit." 
 
Article 7  
 
144.In order to harmonize the duration of suspension of concentrations with the duration of Phase 1, 
the duration of suspension under Article 7 (1) should be extended from three weeks to the 
adoption of a final decision. 
 
145.It was stated to the Commission that the conditions for granting a derogation from the 
suspension are too strict. In particular, it was suggested that if a concentration does not raise 
competition concerns - in the case of de minimis operations, for instance - the Commission 
                     
     
28Cf paragraphs 45 and 66 of the above-mentioned Commission notice on the Calculation of Turnover.  
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should be able to grant a derogation where appropriate, even if there would be no serious 
damage to the undertakings concerned. In order to allow for this possibility, Article 7 could 
be amended accordingly. 
 
Article 10(4) 
 
146.Article 10(4) provides for the exceptional suspension of the four-month period for taking an 
Article 8 decision in cases where, owing to circumstances for which one of the undertakings 
involved in the concentration is responsible, the Commission has had to request information 
by decision pursuant to Article 11 or to order an investigation by decision pursuant to Article 
13. This provision should be expressly extended to Phase 1 proceedings. 
 
Calculation of the turnover of joint undertakings 
 
147.At the time of the adoption of the Merger Regulation, the Commission and the Council 
considered that the review of the thresholds should be combined with the re-examination of 
the method of calculation of turnover of joint undertakings as referred in Article 5(5). This 
has in the meantime been clarified in the above-mentioned Commission Notice on the 
Calculation of Turnover. It is not considered to be necessary to make any changes in this 
respect. 
 
Third party rights 
 
148.Concern was expressed with regard to the short period of time within which third parties can 
comment on phase 1 commitments. This matter was discussed under IV.C. above. 
 
149.It was also suggested that the rights of third parties that apply in writing to be heard pursuant to 
Article 18 (4) of the Merger Regulation should be extended to all third parties that are 
directly concerned by the Commission's objections. The Commission will examine whether 
the current situation should be changed in this respect. 
 
"Undertakings concerned" 
 
150.The Commission will review the text of the Regulation, in order to remove any ambiguities or 
inconsistencies regarding the use of.the term "undertakings concerned". 
 
V.CONCLUSIONS 
 
151.In light of the above, the Green Paper concludes the following: 
 
-In line with subsidiarity, it appears that the current thresholds for the application of the Merger 
Regulation should be reduced in order to cover a larger number of operations with 
significant cross-border effects. In this respect, a combined world-wide threshold of ECU 
2 billion and a Community-wide threshold of ECU 100 million for each of at least two 
companies involved would be more appropriate. 
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-In order to address the problem of multiple national filings in particular, another more limited 
solution could consist in bringing within the exclusive competence of the Commission 
only cases of multiple notification below the current thresholds. 
 
-A number of other, mainly procedural, improvements to the Regulation should be considered, 
including inter alia the treatment of joint ventures and the acceptance of commitments in 
the first phase of investigation. 
 
152.The Commission welcomes a general debate on the Green Paper and invites all interested parties 
to submit their comments by 31 March 1996.  
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 ANNEX  1 
 
  Summary of the survey of the Member States, industry and advisers 
 
 
The Member States 
 
All Member States were requested to provide infomation relating to their national merger control 
legislation, the number and identity of cases treated in 1993 and 1994 and their means of cooperating 
with other national authorities. In addition, their views about the definition of subsidiarity in merger 
control, and about amendments to the Regulation, apart from thresholds, were sought. All Member 
States responded. 
 
Industry 
 
A total of 289 companies from the EEA, Switzerland, Japan, the USA and Norway were contacted 
whose businesses cover both manufacturing and services. The questionnaires related to the 
companies' experience of national and EC merger control legislation, the benefits of the "one-stop 
shop" principle and whether they wished for any changes in the current thresholds. A request for 
examples of multiple national filings was also made. In addition the companies were asked whether 
any other changes should be made to the Regulation. Total responses amounted to 118. 
 
Industry associations. 
 
European representative bodies as well as national industry associations were contacted: in total 40 
questionnaires were despatched. The questions asked were the same as  those in the questionnaire for 
companies. Replies were received from 25 associations. 
 
Advisers 
 
In total 54 advisers, being either law or consulting firms with experience of EC and national merger 
control law, were sent questionnaires. These contained questions relating to their attitudes to 
notification practices, the system of EC merger control, changes in the thresholds and other 
amendments to the Regulation. A request for examples of multiple notifications was also made. A 
total of 24 firms responded. 
 
 
 Questionnaires  sent  Replies received  Response rate 
Member States  15  15  100% 
Industry 289  118  41% 
Associations 40  25 63% 
Advisers 54  24  44%  
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 ANNEX  2 
 National  merger  control systems 
 
in the EEA 
 
 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
IRL  A  -> final decision 
CA -> opinion 
a)yes 
b)yes 
c) - 
a)Gross assets or 
turnover of each of at 
least 2 companies
29.  
 
b)IR£ 10m/IR£ 20m 
(Ecu 12,6m/Ecu 
25,2m)
30 
a)30 days from notif. or 
receipt of information 
 
b)3 months from notif. 
or rec. of information 
a)yes 
 
b)employment + other 
common interest 
criteria 
a) - 
 
b)newspapers and 
magazines: 
no thresholds 
SWEDEN  CA -> clearance 
JA -> prohibit. 
a)yes 
b)yes 
c) - 
a)Total world-wide 
turnover 
 
b)SKr 4 b. 
(Ecu 430m) 
a)1 month 
 
b)4 months from notif. 
for referral to JA 
No deadline for JA 
a)yes 
 
b)public interest 
- 
                     
     
29The assets and turnover thresholds are not specifically limited to Ireland and may be interpreted as referring to worldwide turnover or assets, provided that at least one of 
the enterprises involved is carrying on business in Ireland. In practice, the Department of Enterprise and Employment operates a "short-form" notification procedure 
leading to a "not notifiable" letter to deal with the uncertainties associated with the Act's apparently wide scope. 
     
30These thresholds were converted into ECU on the basis of the average rates for 1994.  
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 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
SPAIN  A ->final decision 
CA -> opinion 
(+investigation in 
phase 2) 
a)no 
b)yes 
c)within 5 years from 
implement. of 
concentration 
a)Market share in SP  
or 
Total turnover in SP 
  
b)25%/20 b. pesetas (Ecu 
125m) 
a)1 month from 
notification 
 
b)6 months from 
notification 
a)yes 
 
b)international com- 
petitiveness, econ. + 
tech. progress, improv. 
in distrib. 
a)- 
 
b) credit and financial 
institutions, insurance: 
special thresholds 
PORT  A -> final decision 
CA -> opinion (for 
phase 2) 
a)yes 
b)yes 
c) -  
a)Market share in P  
or 
Total turnover in P 
 
b)30%/Esc 30b  
(Ecu 180m) 
a)50 work.days from 
notif. 
 
b)95 work.days 
from notif. 
  
a)yes 
 
b)Bilan écon.  or 
international compe-
titiveness. 
a)Credit and financial 
institutions, insurance 
 
 
UK  A -> final decision 
CA -> opinion 
a)no 
b)yes 
c) referral to the MMC 
(Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission) 
within 6 months after 
implem. or receipt of 
inform. 
(pre-merger) 
a)Gross assets world 
wide  taken over 
or 
Market share in UK 
 
b)£70 m. 
(Ecu 90,9m)/25% 
(for pre-notification) 
a)35 work.days from 
notif. (for MMC ref) 
 
b)6 (+3 months) from 
date of reference 
No deadline for Secr. 
of State 
a)yes 
 
b)public interest 
a)- 
 
b) newspaper transfers, 
mergers between water 
companies, media 
GR CA 
(A may overrule on 
grounds of public 
a)yes 
b)yes 
c)notif. within one 
(pre-merger) 
a)Market share in GR 
or 
(pre-merger) 
a) 1 month from 
complete notif. 
a)yes 
 
b)general econ. gains or 
a)- 
 
b1)media  
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 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
interest)  month from implem. of 
concentration 
Total turnover world-
wide+ Turnover of each 
of at least 2 companies 
in GR. 
 
b)25%/Ecu 50m/Ecu 5 
m. 
b) 3 months from 
complete notif. (+ 
possibility for 
extension) 
public interest   
b2)credit institutions, 
insurance: special 
thresholds 
BELG. A  ->  investigation 
CA -> decision 
a)yes 
b)yes 
a)Market share in 
Belgium and 
Total turnover  
 
b)25%/BEF 3 b. 
(Ecu 70m) 
a)1 month from notif. 
 
b)1 month + 75 days 
from notif. (suspension 
possible, for receipt of 
additional infor. etc.) 
a)yes 
b)technical and econ. 
progress, general econ. 
importance, 
international compe- 
titiveness provided that 
restrictions are 
indispensable+ 
not elimination of 
competition 
a)- 
 
b) banks, credit and 
financial institutions, 
insurance: special 
thresholds 
FR.  A -> final decision + 
investigation 
CA -> opinion + 
investigation (for phase 
2) 
a)no 
b)yes 
c)any time after 
implementation. 
a)Total turnover in FR 
 + turnover of at least 2 
comp.  or 
market share in France 
 
b)7bFF+2bFF 
(Ecu1060m+ 
a)2 months after 
notification 
 
b)6 months after 
notification  
a)yes 
 
b)bilan économique et 
social 
a-b)press and audio-
visual sector  
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 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
300m)/25%  
GER. CA   
(A: application for 
exceptional ministerial 
authorisation) 
a) yes 
b) yes 
c) 1 year after complete 
notification (post-
merger control) 
Pre-merger control 
a) World-wide 
turnover of one 
company or World-
wide turnover of each 
of at least 2 comp.  
 
b) DM 2 b./1 b. (Ecu 
1,04 b. /520 m.) 
 
Post-merger control 
Combined world-wide 
turnover of all parties: 
DM 500 m. (ECU 260 
m) 
a) 1 month after 
complete notification 
 
b) + 3 months (can be 
extended by common 
agreement) 
a) yes (CA) 
 
b) public interest 
(exceptional cases: A) 
a) - 
 
b)credit institutions, 
insurance: special 
thresholds 
 
b2) special rules for 
turnover calculation 
- in the retail sector 
- in newspapers and 
magazines 
IT. CA 
(general interest 
criteria can be set by A 
for application by CA;  
no such criteria are set 
at the moment) 
a) yes 
b) yes 
c)  - 
a)Total turnover in IT 
or turnover of target in 
IT. 
 
b)L 606 b/60,6 b (ECU 
300m /30 m) 
a) 30 days from  receipt 
of complete 
notification 
 
b) + 45 days (+30 days 
except., for addit. 
inform.) 
a) yes 
 
b) general interests of 
the national economy  
(see first column) 
a)- 
 
b)Film production and 
distribution: special 
thresholds  
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 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
AUS. JA  a)  yes 
b) yes 
c) yes (for smaller 
concentrations, 
obligation to inform 
JA) 
(for pre-merger) 
a) Total turnover and 
Turnover of each of at 
least 2 comp. 
worldwide 
 
b) Sch 3,5b/5m (Ecu 
250m/0,36m) 
a) 4 weeks from 
complete notification 
 
b) 5 months from 
complete notification 
a) yes 
 
b) Bilan concurr. 
intern. compet. 
a) - 
 
b1) media 
 
b2) banks, insurance: 
special thresholds 
NED. 
(not yet in 
force) 
A a)  yes 
 
b) yes 
 
c) - 
a) Total turnover and 
turnover of each of at 
least 2 comp. in NED. 
 
b) GUIL 250m/30m 
(ECU 116m/14m) 
a) 4 weeks from receipt 
of notification 
 
b) 13 weeks from 
receipt of notification 
a) yes 
 
b) general economic 
interest 
a) banks, insurance 
Iceland  CA-> final decision  a) no 
 
b) yes 
 
c) yes 
a) assumption of a 
dominant position or 
reduction of 
competition in Iceland 
 
b) none 
a) - 
 
b) 2 months after 
becoming aware of the 
merger or takeover 
a) yes 
 
b) no 
a)- 
 
b)- 
Norway  CA-> final decision 
 
A-> appeal of CA's 
a) no 
 
b) yes 
a) creation or 
strengthening of a 
significant restriction 
a) - 
 
b)  6 months after the 
a) yes 
 
b) no 
a) none  
 
b) none  
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 Competent  body 
A  : 
administrative/ministerial 
body 
CA : independent or 
autonomous competition 
authority 
JA : judicial body 
 
Procedures : 
a) Compulsory notif. 
b) Pre-merger control 
c) Post merger control 
Thresholds 
a) Criteria 
b) Level 
Statutory time limits 
a) Phase 1 
b) Phase 2 
Assessment criteria 
a) Dominance or 
restriction of 
competition 
b) Other 
Sectoral regulation 
a) Sectors excluded 
from merger control 
b) Special regulation 
decision  
c) yes 
of competition contrary 
to the achievement of 
an efficient utilization 
of society's resources in 
Norway 
 
b) none 
agreement to acquire   
 